FORMATION
The idea of a Waffen-SS division composed of Hitlerjugend (HJ) members was
first proposed by SS-Gruppenführer Gottlob Berger in January 1943. Berger
approached Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler with the proposition, and Himmler
soon became an enthusiastic advocate.
The plan for a combat division made up of all HJ members born in 1926 was
passed on to Adolf Hitler for his approval. Hitler was also enthusiastic
about the idea, and on 10 February 1943, the official order for the creation
of an HJ division was issued. Berger nominated himself as the divisional
commander, but Himmler instead chose 1.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) veteran, SS-Oberführer Fritz Witt.
A competition was held to design insignia for the new unit. The winning
design, picked from thousands of entries, depicted the Hitlerjugend sigrune
crossing a key from the 1.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division LSSAH's insignia.
By 1 September 1943 over 16,000 HJ recruits had completed their six-week
basic training and were listed on the rosters of the
SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Hitlerjugend. As training continued in Beverloo,
Belgium, the division was notified that it was to be formed as a panzer
rather than a panzergrenadier unit, and the division was redesignated
SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend. Many of the recruits were so young that they
were supplied with sweets and candies instead of the standard tobacco and
alcohol ration. In late October 1943 the division received its final
designation, 12.SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend.
While the HJ members, who had grown up under NSDAP propaganda, were committed
to the Nazi cause, they lacked any military aptitude. To provide a skilled
backbone for the division, veterans from the 1.SS-Panzer-Division LSSAH were
assigned to the Hitlerjugend division as officers and NCOs. Training for the
division was unusual. Witt, realizing that the division had to be made ready
for combat as quickly as possible, ignored many rules and regulations and
instead focused on realistic combat scenarios and live-fire exercises. A
result of this was that the morale of the HJ was exceptionally high, and the
relationship between the officers, NCOs and men was an informal one, based on
mutual trust and respect.
In March 1944 the HJ was deemed ready for active service and was ordered to
move to Caen in Normandy, where it was to form a part of Panzergruppe West,
the German armoured reserve.
Throughout the spring of 1944 the division continued training exercises in
the peaceful area around Caen, familiarizing itself with the terrain. This
was to prove invaluable in the months to come. On 27 May, Witt celebrated his
36th birthday and his recent promotion to SS-Brigadeführer. The peaceful
'holiday atmosphere', as one grenadier described it, was soon to be shattered.
At the beginning of June 1944 the division was declared ready for combat
operations. The Division's tank strength at this time was 81 Panther ausf A /
G and 104 Panzer IV ausf H / J tanks. The division was also equipped with
Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers, three prototype Wirbelwind flakpanzer
vehicles, along with a number of 20 mm, 37 mm and 88 mm flak guns, Hummel,
Wespe and sIG 33 self-propelled guns and regular towed artillery pieces.
Its tank destroyer unit, SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 12, however, was not ready
for action and was understrength in Jagdpanzer IV.
NORMANDY
On 6 June 1944, the Western Allies launched Operation Overlord, the invasion
of Normandy. The HJ, along with the 21.Panzer-Division, was the closest
armoured unit to the landing beaches. Due to Hitler's authorization being
required to release the panzer units, the HJ was not ordered to the front
until 1430 on 6 June. The division's advance to the areas near Sword and Juno
Beaches was severely hampered by incessant allied Jabo (fighter-bomber)
attacks. Forward elements of the HJ finally reached their assembly area near
Evrecy at 2200 on 6 June.
On 7 June, SS-Standartenführer Kurt Meyer's ("Panzermeyer")
SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 25, along with the II./Abteilung from
SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Max Wünsche's SS-Panzer-Regiment 12, were supported by
artillery and ordered to crush advancing Canadian infantry and armour and
drive through to the coast, still only a few miles away. In Meyer's words
they were to "throw the little fish into the sea". Although they destroyed
many Canadian tanks and overran a company of the North Nova Scotia
Highlanders in Authie, the attack failed to break through the advancing
Canadians. Meyer had relied on the shock value of the rapid attacks that had
served his units so well on the Eastern front.
Without support from other units on his own flanks and no reconnaissance
information with which to plan his attack it was initially very successful
but rapidly lost its momentum. The Sherbrooke Fusiliers lost over 25 Sherman
tanks to the Panzer IV tanks and anti tank guns of 12th SS in the opening
minutes of the counterattack. The 12th SS managed to push the portion of the
Canadian spearhead they attacked back two miles but the remaining North Nova
Scotia Highlanders halted the 25th regiment and established a defence.
The fighting was brutal and there were reports from both sides of atrocities.
German prisoners were found shot dead along the railway line south of Rots,
Oberst Luxemburger of Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 was tied to the front of
a British tank as a bullet shield. According to accounts from Canadian
prisoners, the youth of the Hitler Jugend were frustrated and mad with rage
and there were numerous incidences of North Nova prisoners being shot,
bludgeoned to death, and even run over with a truck. After the war, war
crimes judges in Canada acknowledged the bitter and ruthless nature of the
fighting and that often enemy soldiers trying to surrender were mistakenly
shot. Battle casualties for the day on both sides were virtually even. Both
forces suffered approximately 80 killed and around 175 wounded or captured.
It was a hard and bloody fight to a draw.
Meyer set up his command post in the Abbey Ardennes, whose towers provided an
excellent view of the countryside. In the early evening of 7 June, as he
planned the regiment's next moves. Meyer's regiment was deployed near the
villages of Authie and Buron, in positions covering the vital Carpiquet
Aerodrome. Repeated assaults by Canadian units and continuous artillery and
air bombardment failed to dislodge them until they were finally driven off in
vicious hand-to-hand fighting with the Highland Light Infantry of Canada on 8
July.
On 8 June, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 26 under command of
SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Wilhelm Mohnke arrived on the battlefield. Meyer's
attack had pushed back one part of the Canadian advance but another brigade
had occupied a group of small villages two miles into the German line. They
crossed behind Meyer's regiment and the 26th took up positions to their west.
After planning and positioning the regiment for a powerful thrust the I
Battalion launched an attack towards Norrey-en-Bessin, defended by the Regina
Rifles of the 3rd Canadian Division. Their orders were to drive over the
Canadians and force a deep wedge between them and the British division to the
west. Again, no reconnaissance of the Canadian positions was done and this
time the youth of the 12th SS infantry would wade into a maelstrom of
defensive fire from firmly established defensive positions.
The attack, launched at 0330 hours - had little initial success. The various
companies in the attacking 12th SS failed to co-ordinate their moves towards
the Canadians and, despite heavy casualties during repeated attempts by the
infantry, Canadian artillery and supporting heavy machine guns of the Cameron
Highlanders of Ottawa took a heavy toll on each attacking company of SS
troops. The Regina Rifles held their ground and the I Battalion fell back.
On the Canadian right the II Battalion attacked the Royal Winnipeg Rifles
defending the village of Putot-en-Bessin. The Battalion managed to break into
the village and surround several companies, effectively pushing the
Winnipeg's out of the village, inflicting 256 casualties - of which 175 were
taken prisoner.[1] A counter-attack launched at 20:30 by the Canadian
Scottish, however, regained Putot-en-Bessin, and the II Battalion withdrew
and dug-in south of the village.
Following the battle SS-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 12 deployed to the west of
Mohnke's regiment and, by the evening of 8 June the division, while having
failed in its assignment to drive the Canadians into the sea, had effectively
halted the units of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in the Allied advance
on Caen.
Exhausted grenadiers of Kurt Meyers SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 25 in Rots,
Normandy, 9th of June 1944.Despite the ferocity of the 12th SS
counterattacks, the Division failed to fulfil its orders to throw the
attacking allies back into the sea. Once British troops had moved up to the
positions now firmly held by the troops of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
that faced the 12th SS, the British dug in and established a firm line of
defence from which they could launch future attacks. The allies were firmly
on the continent to stay. The panzer army that contained the 12SS and the
21st Army Group they opposed, settled into a bitter series of battles that
would finally lead to the liberation of Normandy.
On 14 June, a British naval barrage hit the divisional command post in
Venoix, killing Witt and leaving the division without a commander. The
thirty-three-year-old "Panzermeyer" was ordered to take command of the
division, becoming the youngest divisional commander of either side during
the war.
Over the next four weeks, the division managed to halt all Allied attempts to
take Caen, despite the Allies' superior numbers and overwhelming air
supremacy. The ferocity of the combat during this period equalled or exceeded
anything the German troops had encountered on the Eastern front. Both sides
claim that the other gave orders not to take prisoners but it was scarcely
needed by the Allies at any rate. Time and again to the consternation of the
attacking Allied troops, the youth of the 12th SS fought to the bitter end.
Despite their successes in breaking up several major attacks, the division
suffered immense losses, and in the first week of July 1944, Meyer ignored
orders to hold the line north of Caen and withdrew the shattered remnants of
his division south of the city. In the fighting from the day after D-Day
until 9 July the division had lost 4,000 dead with a further 8,000 wounded
and missing.
The division was to have little respite though, and on 19 July took part in
the defence against the Anglo-Canadian Operation Goodwood. Following this,
the division was pulled out of the line and used to form the mobile reserve
for I.SS-Panzerkorps. Rather than rest and refitting, the division found
itself involved in constant fire-brigade actions. In early August, the
division took part in defensive actions to halt two Allied operations,
Totalise and Tractable. At the launch of Totalise, the sixty remaining
panzers of the HJ were faced with over 600 tanks of the Canadian First Army.
Despite these odds, the division managed to halt the offensive short of its
objectives.
Hitlerjugend, reduced to a few thousand men and a handful of vehicles, now
took part in operations to try to keep the Falaise Pocket open and to help
trapped German forces to escape. On 20 August the pocket collapsed and tens
of thousands of troops of the Seventh Army went into captivity. The scattered
remnants of the division were pulled back behind the Seine River.
The 12th SS had established a reputation as fierce combatants. Of the battles
around Caen, it was said by a former opponent "The 12th SS-Panzer Division,
which defended this sector, fought with a toughness and intensity which was
not encountered anywhere else during the entire campaign."
WITHDRAWL
Hitlerjugend was given a brief respite, but received virtually no
reinforcements or equipment. The division was soon thrown back into battle,
and took part in the fighting withdrawal to the Franco-Belgian border. By
September 1944, the division counted less than 2,000 men, without armour or
heavy equipment. On 6 September, Kurt Meyer was captured by Belgian
partisans. Meyer had removed his SS uniform and was wearing the uniform of a
regular German army officer. In the confusion of the withdrawal, the division
was unable to undertake a rescue attempt. SS-Obersturmbannführer Hubert Meyer
was placed in command of the division.
In November 1944, the division was pulled out of the line and sent to
Neinburg in Germany, where it was to be reformed. The majority of the
much-needed reinforcements were transferred Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine
personnel, and the reformed division would never match the elite status it
had boasted in the spring of 1944. Late in the month, Hubert Meyer was
replaced by SS-Obersturmbannführer Hugo Kraas, and the division was attached
to SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich's 6.SS-Panzer-Armee, which was
forming up for Operation Wacht Am Rhein (the Second Battle of the Ardennes,
popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge), a large-scale offensive to
recapture Antwerp and halt the Allied advance.
The operation opened on 16 December 1944. Kampfgruppe Peiper from the
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler led the assault, breaking through the enemy
lines. The HJ, which was to follow the Kampfgruppe and exploit the
breakthrough, became bogged down in traffic jams caused by the
12.Volksgrenadier-Division. When the division reached the front, it was met
with heavy resistance from American troops stationed on the Elsenborn Ridge.
Despite several intense efforts, the division could not budge the American
defenders. As a result, the division was ordered to swing left and follow the
advance line of the remainder of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. American
defenders prevented the division from reaching its objective, and after the
destruction of Kampfgruppe Peiper, the advance of Dietrich's army altogether.
Near the end of the year, the HJ was shifted south to take part in the
efforts to capture Bastogne, and saw heavy fighting around the city. By 18
January 1945, the HJ, along with all the German forces, had been pushed back
to its starting positions.
HUNGARY/AUSTRIA
On 20 January 1945, Dietrich's 6.SS-Panzer-Armee was ordered east to Hungary
where it was to take part in an offensive to recapture the Hungarian
oilfields and open the way to Budapest, where 45,000 men of the
IX.SS-Gebirgskorps had been encircled.
While the division was in transit, the IV.SS-Panzerkorps launched several
ill-fated relief operations. The HJ, alongside the LSSAH as a part of
I.SS-Panzerkorps arrived in Hungary in early February 1945, only a few days
before the city fell. The division was thrown into action against the Gran
Bridgehead, a strong salient formed by the Soviets over the Danube near the
town of Gran. The HJ and the LSSAH both fought well, and by the end of
February the bridghead had been destroyed.
The division was next to take part in Operation Frühlingserwachen (Spring
Awakening), the operation to retake the Hungarian oilfields. Hitler,
desperate to keep the operation a secret, had ordered that no reconnaissance
of the battlefield was allowed before the attack began. The attack got
underway on 6 March 1945 in atrocious conditions. The spring thaw meant that
the German attack was confined to a few narrow roads, and after initial
successes, the offensive was aborted after a Soviet counterattack threatened
to encircle the German forces. After the failure of "Frühlingserwachen",
Hitler lost faith in the Waffen-SS and ordered that the honorary cuffbands
issued to the divisions involved in the attack be returned. Outraged at the
order, Dietrich refused to pass it on to his men.
In mid-March, a heavy Soviet counterattack near Stuhlweissenberg split
Armeegruppe Balck in half and resulted in a general withdrawal towards
Vienna. The HJ was involved in many desperate rearguard actions, and on 13
April fell back from Vienna. Withdrawing through Odenburg and Hirtenburg, the
division reached Linz, Austria near the American lines. On 8 May 1945, 10,000
survivors of the division surrendered to the Americans near Enns. In a final
act of defiance, the division refused to drape their vehicles with white
flags, as the Americans had ordered.
History Menu
The idea of a Waffen-SS division composed of Hitlerjugend (HJ) members was
first proposed by SS-Gruppenführer Gottlob Berger in January 1943. Berger
approached Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler with the proposition, and Himmler
soon became an enthusiastic advocate.
The plan for a combat division made up of all HJ members born in 1926 was
passed on to Adolf Hitler for his approval. Hitler was also enthusiastic
about the idea, and on 10 February 1943, the official order for the creation
of an HJ division was issued. Berger nominated himself as the divisional
commander, but Himmler instead chose 1.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) veteran, SS-Oberführer Fritz Witt.
A competition was held to design insignia for the new unit. The winning
design, picked from thousands of entries, depicted the Hitlerjugend sigrune
crossing a key from the 1.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division LSSAH's insignia.
By 1 September 1943 over 16,000 HJ recruits had completed their six-week
basic training and were listed on the rosters of the
SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Hitlerjugend. As training continued in Beverloo,
Belgium, the division was notified that it was to be formed as a panzer
rather than a panzergrenadier unit, and the division was redesignated
SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend. Many of the recruits were so young that they
were supplied with sweets and candies instead of the standard tobacco and
alcohol ration. In late October 1943 the division received its final
designation, 12.SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend.
While the HJ members, who had grown up under NSDAP propaganda, were committed
to the Nazi cause, they lacked any military aptitude. To provide a skilled
backbone for the division, veterans from the 1.SS-Panzer-Division LSSAH were
assigned to the Hitlerjugend division as officers and NCOs. Training for the
division was unusual. Witt, realizing that the division had to be made ready
for combat as quickly as possible, ignored many rules and regulations and
instead focused on realistic combat scenarios and live-fire exercises. A
result of this was that the morale of the HJ was exceptionally high, and the
relationship between the officers, NCOs and men was an informal one, based on
mutual trust and respect.
In March 1944 the HJ was deemed ready for active service and was ordered to
move to Caen in Normandy, where it was to form a part of Panzergruppe West,
the German armoured reserve.
Throughout the spring of 1944 the division continued training exercises in
the peaceful area around Caen, familiarizing itself with the terrain. This
was to prove invaluable in the months to come. On 27 May, Witt celebrated his
36th birthday and his recent promotion to SS-Brigadeführer. The peaceful
'holiday atmosphere', as one grenadier described it, was soon to be shattered.
At the beginning of June 1944 the division was declared ready for combat
operations. The Division's tank strength at this time was 81 Panther ausf A /
G and 104 Panzer IV ausf H / J tanks. The division was also equipped with
Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers, three prototype Wirbelwind flakpanzer
vehicles, along with a number of 20 mm, 37 mm and 88 mm flak guns, Hummel,
Wespe and sIG 33 self-propelled guns and regular towed artillery pieces.
Its tank destroyer unit, SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 12, however, was not ready
for action and was understrength in Jagdpanzer IV.
NORMANDY
On 6 June 1944, the Western Allies launched Operation Overlord, the invasion
of Normandy. The HJ, along with the 21.Panzer-Division, was the closest
armoured unit to the landing beaches. Due to Hitler's authorization being
required to release the panzer units, the HJ was not ordered to the front
until 1430 on 6 June. The division's advance to the areas near Sword and Juno
Beaches was severely hampered by incessant allied Jabo (fighter-bomber)
attacks. Forward elements of the HJ finally reached their assembly area near
Evrecy at 2200 on 6 June.
On 7 June, SS-Standartenführer Kurt Meyer's ("Panzermeyer")
SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 25, along with the II./Abteilung from
SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Max Wünsche's SS-Panzer-Regiment 12, were supported by
artillery and ordered to crush advancing Canadian infantry and armour and
drive through to the coast, still only a few miles away. In Meyer's words
they were to "throw the little fish into the sea". Although they destroyed
many Canadian tanks and overran a company of the North Nova Scotia
Highlanders in Authie, the attack failed to break through the advancing
Canadians. Meyer had relied on the shock value of the rapid attacks that had
served his units so well on the Eastern front.
Without support from other units on his own flanks and no reconnaissance
information with which to plan his attack it was initially very successful
but rapidly lost its momentum. The Sherbrooke Fusiliers lost over 25 Sherman
tanks to the Panzer IV tanks and anti tank guns of 12th SS in the opening
minutes of the counterattack. The 12th SS managed to push the portion of the
Canadian spearhead they attacked back two miles but the remaining North Nova
Scotia Highlanders halted the 25th regiment and established a defence.
The fighting was brutal and there were reports from both sides of atrocities.
German prisoners were found shot dead along the railway line south of Rots,
Oberst Luxemburger of Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 was tied to the front of
a British tank as a bullet shield. According to accounts from Canadian
prisoners, the youth of the Hitler Jugend were frustrated and mad with rage
and there were numerous incidences of North Nova prisoners being shot,
bludgeoned to death, and even run over with a truck. After the war, war
crimes judges in Canada acknowledged the bitter and ruthless nature of the
fighting and that often enemy soldiers trying to surrender were mistakenly
shot. Battle casualties for the day on both sides were virtually even. Both
forces suffered approximately 80 killed and around 175 wounded or captured.
It was a hard and bloody fight to a draw.
Meyer set up his command post in the Abbey Ardennes, whose towers provided an
excellent view of the countryside. In the early evening of 7 June, as he
planned the regiment's next moves. Meyer's regiment was deployed near the
villages of Authie and Buron, in positions covering the vital Carpiquet
Aerodrome. Repeated assaults by Canadian units and continuous artillery and
air bombardment failed to dislodge them until they were finally driven off in
vicious hand-to-hand fighting with the Highland Light Infantry of Canada on 8
July.
On 8 June, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 26 under command of
SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Wilhelm Mohnke arrived on the battlefield. Meyer's
attack had pushed back one part of the Canadian advance but another brigade
had occupied a group of small villages two miles into the German line. They
crossed behind Meyer's regiment and the 26th took up positions to their west.
After planning and positioning the regiment for a powerful thrust the I
Battalion launched an attack towards Norrey-en-Bessin, defended by the Regina
Rifles of the 3rd Canadian Division. Their orders were to drive over the
Canadians and force a deep wedge between them and the British division to the
west. Again, no reconnaissance of the Canadian positions was done and this
time the youth of the 12th SS infantry would wade into a maelstrom of
defensive fire from firmly established defensive positions.
The attack, launched at 0330 hours - had little initial success. The various
companies in the attacking 12th SS failed to co-ordinate their moves towards
the Canadians and, despite heavy casualties during repeated attempts by the
infantry, Canadian artillery and supporting heavy machine guns of the Cameron
Highlanders of Ottawa took a heavy toll on each attacking company of SS
troops. The Regina Rifles held their ground and the I Battalion fell back.
On the Canadian right the II Battalion attacked the Royal Winnipeg Rifles
defending the village of Putot-en-Bessin. The Battalion managed to break into
the village and surround several companies, effectively pushing the
Winnipeg's out of the village, inflicting 256 casualties - of which 175 were
taken prisoner.[1] A counter-attack launched at 20:30 by the Canadian
Scottish, however, regained Putot-en-Bessin, and the II Battalion withdrew
and dug-in south of the village.
Following the battle SS-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 12 deployed to the west of
Mohnke's regiment and, by the evening of 8 June the division, while having
failed in its assignment to drive the Canadians into the sea, had effectively
halted the units of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in the Allied advance
on Caen.
Exhausted grenadiers of Kurt Meyers SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 25 in Rots,
Normandy, 9th of June 1944.Despite the ferocity of the 12th SS
counterattacks, the Division failed to fulfil its orders to throw the
attacking allies back into the sea. Once British troops had moved up to the
positions now firmly held by the troops of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
that faced the 12th SS, the British dug in and established a firm line of
defence from which they could launch future attacks. The allies were firmly
on the continent to stay. The panzer army that contained the 12SS and the
21st Army Group they opposed, settled into a bitter series of battles that
would finally lead to the liberation of Normandy.
On 14 June, a British naval barrage hit the divisional command post in
Venoix, killing Witt and leaving the division without a commander. The
thirty-three-year-old "Panzermeyer" was ordered to take command of the
division, becoming the youngest divisional commander of either side during
the war.
Over the next four weeks, the division managed to halt all Allied attempts to
take Caen, despite the Allies' superior numbers and overwhelming air
supremacy. The ferocity of the combat during this period equalled or exceeded
anything the German troops had encountered on the Eastern front. Both sides
claim that the other gave orders not to take prisoners but it was scarcely
needed by the Allies at any rate. Time and again to the consternation of the
attacking Allied troops, the youth of the 12th SS fought to the bitter end.
Despite their successes in breaking up several major attacks, the division
suffered immense losses, and in the first week of July 1944, Meyer ignored
orders to hold the line north of Caen and withdrew the shattered remnants of
his division south of the city. In the fighting from the day after D-Day
until 9 July the division had lost 4,000 dead with a further 8,000 wounded
and missing.
The division was to have little respite though, and on 19 July took part in
the defence against the Anglo-Canadian Operation Goodwood. Following this,
the division was pulled out of the line and used to form the mobile reserve
for I.SS-Panzerkorps. Rather than rest and refitting, the division found
itself involved in constant fire-brigade actions. In early August, the
division took part in defensive actions to halt two Allied operations,
Totalise and Tractable. At the launch of Totalise, the sixty remaining
panzers of the HJ were faced with over 600 tanks of the Canadian First Army.
Despite these odds, the division managed to halt the offensive short of its
objectives.
Hitlerjugend, reduced to a few thousand men and a handful of vehicles, now
took part in operations to try to keep the Falaise Pocket open and to help
trapped German forces to escape. On 20 August the pocket collapsed and tens
of thousands of troops of the Seventh Army went into captivity. The scattered
remnants of the division were pulled back behind the Seine River.
The 12th SS had established a reputation as fierce combatants. Of the battles
around Caen, it was said by a former opponent "The 12th SS-Panzer Division,
which defended this sector, fought with a toughness and intensity which was
not encountered anywhere else during the entire campaign."
WITHDRAWL
Hitlerjugend was given a brief respite, but received virtually no
reinforcements or equipment. The division was soon thrown back into battle,
and took part in the fighting withdrawal to the Franco-Belgian border. By
September 1944, the division counted less than 2,000 men, without armour or
heavy equipment. On 6 September, Kurt Meyer was captured by Belgian
partisans. Meyer had removed his SS uniform and was wearing the uniform of a
regular German army officer. In the confusion of the withdrawal, the division
was unable to undertake a rescue attempt. SS-Obersturmbannführer Hubert Meyer
was placed in command of the division.
In November 1944, the division was pulled out of the line and sent to
Neinburg in Germany, where it was to be reformed. The majority of the
much-needed reinforcements were transferred Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine
personnel, and the reformed division would never match the elite status it
had boasted in the spring of 1944. Late in the month, Hubert Meyer was
replaced by SS-Obersturmbannführer Hugo Kraas, and the division was attached
to SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich's 6.SS-Panzer-Armee, which was
forming up for Operation Wacht Am Rhein (the Second Battle of the Ardennes,
popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge), a large-scale offensive to
recapture Antwerp and halt the Allied advance.
The operation opened on 16 December 1944. Kampfgruppe Peiper from the
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler led the assault, breaking through the enemy
lines. The HJ, which was to follow the Kampfgruppe and exploit the
breakthrough, became bogged down in traffic jams caused by the
12.Volksgrenadier-Division. When the division reached the front, it was met
with heavy resistance from American troops stationed on the Elsenborn Ridge.
Despite several intense efforts, the division could not budge the American
defenders. As a result, the division was ordered to swing left and follow the
advance line of the remainder of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. American
defenders prevented the division from reaching its objective, and after the
destruction of Kampfgruppe Peiper, the advance of Dietrich's army altogether.
Near the end of the year, the HJ was shifted south to take part in the
efforts to capture Bastogne, and saw heavy fighting around the city. By 18
January 1945, the HJ, along with all the German forces, had been pushed back
to its starting positions.
HUNGARY/AUSTRIA
On 20 January 1945, Dietrich's 6.SS-Panzer-Armee was ordered east to Hungary
where it was to take part in an offensive to recapture the Hungarian
oilfields and open the way to Budapest, where 45,000 men of the
IX.SS-Gebirgskorps had been encircled.
While the division was in transit, the IV.SS-Panzerkorps launched several
ill-fated relief operations. The HJ, alongside the LSSAH as a part of
I.SS-Panzerkorps arrived in Hungary in early February 1945, only a few days
before the city fell. The division was thrown into action against the Gran
Bridgehead, a strong salient formed by the Soviets over the Danube near the
town of Gran. The HJ and the LSSAH both fought well, and by the end of
February the bridghead had been destroyed.
The division was next to take part in Operation Frühlingserwachen (Spring
Awakening), the operation to retake the Hungarian oilfields. Hitler,
desperate to keep the operation a secret, had ordered that no reconnaissance
of the battlefield was allowed before the attack began. The attack got
underway on 6 March 1945 in atrocious conditions. The spring thaw meant that
the German attack was confined to a few narrow roads, and after initial
successes, the offensive was aborted after a Soviet counterattack threatened
to encircle the German forces. After the failure of "Frühlingserwachen",
Hitler lost faith in the Waffen-SS and ordered that the honorary cuffbands
issued to the divisions involved in the attack be returned. Outraged at the
order, Dietrich refused to pass it on to his men.
In mid-March, a heavy Soviet counterattack near Stuhlweissenberg split
Armeegruppe Balck in half and resulted in a general withdrawal towards
Vienna. The HJ was involved in many desperate rearguard actions, and on 13
April fell back from Vienna. Withdrawing through Odenburg and Hirtenburg, the
division reached Linz, Austria near the American lines. On 8 May 1945, 10,000
survivors of the division surrendered to the Americans near Enns. In a final
act of defiance, the division refused to drape their vehicles with white
flags, as the Americans had ordered.
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